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Abstract
We consider a resource management problem in a multi-cell downlink OFDMA network whereby
the goal is to find the optimal combination of (i) assignment of users to base stations and (ii) resource
allocation strategies at each base station. Efficient resource management protocols must rely on users
truthfully reporting privately held information such as downlink channel states. However, individual
users can manipulate the resulting resource allocation (by misreporting their private information) if by
doing so can improve their payoff. Therefore, it is of interest to design efficient resource management
protocols that are strategy-proof, i.e. it is in the users’ best interests to truthfully report their private
information. Unfortunately, we show that the implementation of any protocol that is efficient and
strategy-proof is NP-hard. Thus, we propose a computationally tractable strategy-proof mechanism
that is approximately efficient, i.e. the solution obtained yields at least 12 of the optimal throughput.
Simulations are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.
Index Terms
Heterogenous Network, Mechanism Design, Resource Allocation, Base Station Association, Ap-
proximation Bounds, Computational Complexity, Nash Equilibrium, Price of Anarchy
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a downlink OFDMA network with multiple base stations (BSs) serving a group of
users. The BSs operate on non-overlapping spectrum bands in frequency division duplex (FDD) mode.
The objective is to find the best per-BS resource allocation strategy and the user-BS assignment to
achieve spectral efficiency and load balancing across the networks. This problem is well motivated by
many practical networks such as the multi-technology heterogenous networks (HetNet) [1], [2], the
IEEE 802.22 Wireless Regional Area Network (WRAN) [3] or a Wi-Fi network with multiple access
points [4]. For example, in the HetNet, multiple wireless access technologies such as Wi-Fi, LTE or
WiMAX are available for the same region. These networks operate on different spectrum bands and
all utilize OFDMA for downlink transmission. Integrating these different radio access technologies and
making them available to the user devices can significantly increase the overall spectral efficiency as
well as achieve load balancing across different networks. The mobile users can choose from one of
the technologies/networks for association, and they can switch between different technologies/networks
to avoid congestion (i.e., “vertical handoff” operation, see [1]). The user-network assignment and the
per-network resource allocation need to be performed jointly to achieve optimal network-wide resource
allocation.
There are three major challenges for optimal resource allocation in such networks.
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21) When operating in FDD mode, the network requires the users to measure and report the downlink
channel states for efficient resource allocation. An untruthful user may incorrectly report this information
for its own benefit. The possibilities of various forms of untruthfulness in user behaviors in wireless net-
works have been recently noted (see e.g., [5]–[8]). Reference [6] has discovered that certain commercial
802.11 devices are specially manipulated to trick the access points for better rates. Such manipulation
can take the form of a non-uniform backoff procedure [6] or falsely reported traffic priorities [7].
As suggested in [5], in FDD cellular networks it is also possible to manipulate the devices’ channel
feedback procedure, as the compliance testing is usually limited to a few standardized scenarios. It is
projected that the users of future networks may have stronger ability (and incentives) for manipulating
their devices. See [5] for detailed literature review in this direction. The presence of the untruthful users
can significantly reduce the overall system performance and limit network access to truthful users.
2) Even assuming the users truthfully report their channel states, finding the global optimal resource
allocation is still computationally intractable (this result will be shown in Section II).
3) There is no central entity to compute and enforce a desired user-network assignment and network-
wide resource allocation [4].
Consequently, a good resource allocation scheme must possess the following features: i) it should
provide efficient utilization of the spectrum; ii) it must be strategy-proof, i.e., it is in the users’ best
interests to truthfully reveal their private information; iii) it is distributedly implementable, in the sense
that both the BSs and the users can take part in the scheme with only local information and local
computation.
A. Literature Review
The problem of finding an optimal resource allocation for OFDMA network when the user-BS
assignment is fixed and there is complete information on channel states has been widely studied, e.g.,
[9]–[11]. Various algorithms are developed to solve the BS’s utility maximization problems by allocating
the transmission power and the channels in optimal ways. The joint problem of BS assignment and
resource allocation in OFDMA network has been analyzed under complete information and the ability
to enforce decisions from a centralized standpoint, for example, [12], [13]. However, in many practical
networks there are no entities capable of performing the centralized decision making. Another strand
of the literature deals precisely with this case by using non-cooperative game theory [14]–[17]. Users
selfishly compute their power control and cell site selection strategies to maximize their own utilities.
With proper design of the utility functions, equilibrium solutions can be obtained in distributed fashion.
However, complete information on the channel states and/or the utility functions is assumed. The overall
efficiencies of the identified equilibrium solutions are not characterized.
There are many recent works that design mechanisms for resource allocation problems in networks
with strategic users and/or incomplete information [5], [18], [19]. It is commonly assumed that resources
are divisible and that there is a closed-form expression that describes the interdependency of users’
decisions. In contrast, in our problem the resource allocation decisions are mixed in nature, i.e., decisions
such as user-BS assignment and channel assignment are discrete (not divisible), while the BSs’ power
allocation decision is continuous (divisible). In addition, the interdependency in users’ decisions is
only implicitly characterized as the solution to the optimal resource management problem at each BS.
As a result, the problem considered in this paper does not adequately fit into any of the frameworks
considered in the above cited papers. We mention that the recent work [5] considered an incomplete
information setting similar to ours, in which the FDD network lacks the true channel states due to the
false report by the users. The objective though is to design optimal user scheduling algorithms, which
is different from the objective of the present paper.
3Lower bounds of the efficiency of the Nash Equilibrium (NE), or the price of anarchy, have been
analyzed for network resource allocation games. Reference [20] considered a routing game in which the
inefficiency is due to the selfishness of the users. Reference [21] analyzed a network utility maximization
problem in which the strategic behavior of the users leads to efficiency loss. For both of the above cases
the optimal system level problems can be solved globally, whereas in our case the overall problem is
already difficult to solve. In [22], Vetta discussed the lower bounds of the NEs for a family of non-
cooperative games assuming a special structure of the users’ utility functions. Applications of this latter
result in communication and sensor networks include [23] and [24]. However, these works use highly
stylized utility functions so that the result in [22] can be directly used.
B. Contributions
The main contributions of our paper are summarized as follows.
• We show that solving the joint BS assignment and resource allocation problem, even with truthful
users, is NP-hard. In most existing complexity results for resource management in wireless com-
munications (e.g., [25], [26]), the hardness of the problem is mainly due to the possibility of strong
interference among the users. In contrast, in our problem the hardness lies in its mixed (discrete
and continuous) formulation.
• The complexity of solving the joint problem optimally prevents the implementation of any mech-
anism that is both efficient and strategy-proof. To ensure tractability, we design a novel mecha-
nism that implements an approximately optimal strategy. In the proposed mechanism each user
dynamically selects a BS to maximize its own utility, and the BSs implement the celebrated
Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism (VCG) [27]–[29] to allocate resource under the current user-BS
assignment profile.
• We show that our mechanism achieves at least 12 of the optimal throughput. This result relies
on a key observation that the per-BS optimal throughput admits certain submodular property.
Importantly, the obtained efficiency bounds hold true with or without the presence of the untruthful
users. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no reported work that characterizes the
efficiency of the equilibrium solutions for the considered problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II formulates the problem and provides its
complexity status. Section III and IV describe the mechanism for the resource management problem as
well as its distributed implementation. Section V gives some extensions of the algorithm. Section VI
provides simulation results. Section VII concludes the paper.
Notations: We use bold faced characters to denote vectors. We use x[i] to denote the ith element
of vector x. We use x−i to denote the vector [x[1], · · · ,x[i− 1],x[i + 1], · · · x[N ]]. We use [y,x−i] to
denote a vector x with its ith element replaced by y. We use ∨ to denote componentwise maximization:
x ∨ y , {z|z[i] = max{x[i],y[i]},∀ i}. N \ i defines a subset of N : N \ i , {j : j ∈ N , j 6= i}. The
main notations used in this paper are listed in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a service area with a set N , {1, 2, · · · , N} of users served by a set W , {1, 2, · · · ,W}
of BSs (or networks). Each BS w operates on the set of channels Kw, with the bandwidth of each
channel equally set to be ∆fw. Let K , ∪w∈WKw denote the set of all channels. Suppose any two
channels do not overlap, i.e., Kw ∩ Kv = ∅, ∀ w 6= v. Such assumption is justified for example in
the multi-technology HetNet or in the IEEE 802.22 cognitive radio Wireless Regional Area Network
(WRAN) [3]. In the latter network, a particular geographical region may be served by multiple service
providers (SPs), or by multiple Access Points (APs) installed by a single SP. When operating in the
4TABLE I
A LIST OF NOTATIONS
N The set of all users W The set of all BSs
K The set of all channels Kw The set of channels belongs to BS w
|hki |
2 The channel gain of user i on channel k pkw The transmit power of BS w on channel k
p¯w The power budget for BS w βkw The user assignment of BS w on channel k
a The association profile a−i The association profile without user i
ri(a) The rate assigned to user i Rw(a) The optimal throughput of BS w under a
R(a) The optimal system throughput under a Nw(a) The set of users associated to BS w
Ui(a) The utility of user i Ti(a) The tax imposed on user i
“normal mode”, the APs/SPs that serve the same region indeed operate on non-overlapping portions of
the available spectrum, by using proper spectrum etiquette protocols (see Section 6.22 in [3]).
Let
{
|hki |
2
}
k∈Kw
denote the channel gains of the set of channels from BS w to user i; Let
{
nki
}
k∈K
denote the set of measured noise powers at user i on different channels. Both the channel gains and the
noise powers are considered as private information to the users, as in the FDD mode they are measured
at the mobile devices and then fedback to the BSs.
Define a length N vector a as the association profile in the network, with its ith element a[i] = w
indicating that user i is associated to BS w. Define a−i , [a[1], · · · ,a[i− 1],a[i+ 1], · · · a[N ]] as an
association profile in which user i drops out of the network. For each BS w, denote the set of associated
users as Nw(a) , {i : a[i] = w}, which is a function of a.
In a downlink OFDMA network, a BS w ∈ W can transmit to a single user i ∈ Nw(a) on a
given channel k ∈ Kw. Let βw , {βkw}k∈Kw be a feasible channel assignment scheme for BS w, i.e.,
βkw = i ∈ Nw(a) means channel k is assigned to user i. Let pw , {pkw}k∈Kw be a feasible power
allocation scheme for BS w: pw ≥ 0,
∑
k∈Kw
pkw ≤ p¯w, where p¯w is the power budget for BS w. Let
β , {βw}w∈W and p , {pw}w∈W .
Let us define ri(β,p,a) as the transmission rate that user i can obtain under the resource allocation
scheme (β,p,a). With continuous rate adaptation, this rate can be expressed as:
ri(β,p, a) =
∑
k∈Ka[i]
∆fa[i] log
(
1 +
|hki |
2pk
a[i]
τnki
1
{
βk
a[i] = i
})
(1)
where 1{·} is the indicator function; τ is the capacity gap which is determined by the target Bit Error
Rate (BER) as: τ = − ln(5BER)1.5 (see [30]).
The objective of the resource allocation is to find the tuple (β,p,a) that achieves efficient spectrum
utilization within each BS/network while balancing the loads across different BSs/networks. Mathemat-
ically, we formulate the overall resource allocation problem as follows
max
a,β,p
∑
w∈W
αw
∑
i∈Nw(a)
ri(β,p, a) (SYS)
s.t. a[i] ∈ W , ∀ i ∈ N ,
βkw ∈ Nw(a), ∀ k ∈ Kw, ∀ w ∈ W ,
pw ≥ 0,
∑
k∈Kw
pkw ≤ p¯w, ∀ w ∈ W .
The load balancing property of this formulation is manifested by: 1) introducing the association as
a decision variable for the users; 2) including the weighting factors {αw ≥ 0}Ww=1 in the objective.
The first factor enables the users to effectively avoid congestion by switching to light-loaded BSs in
5a timely fashion, while the second factor allows the network operator to further shift the traffic to the
BSs with larger weights.
A. The BSs’ Resource Management: Optimal Channel Assignment and Power Allocation
We first describe each BS’s optimal resource management strategy. Let us assume that each BS w has
perfect knowledge of downlink normalized channel states of its associated users hw ,
{hki
nki
}
i∈Nw(a),k∈Kw(this assumption will be relaxed later).
First consider a simple case where a equal power allocation strategy is used, that is: pkw =
p¯w
|Kw|
, ∀ k ∈
Kw. Each BS w then optimizes its throughput by picking a suitable user to serve on each channel.
Mathematically, it solves the following channel assignment (CA) problem
max
βw
αw
∑
i∈Nw(a)
ri(β,p, a) (CA)
s.t. βkw ∈ Nw(a), ∀ k ∈ Kw.
The optimal solution to this problem is to assign each channel to the best user [9]:(
βkw
)∗
= i∗, where i∗ ∈ arg max
i∈Nw(a)
|hki |
2
τnki
. (2)
On the other hand, if the BSs can optimize both its channel assignment and power allocation, then a
BS w solves the following channel assignment and power allocation (CAPA) problem:
max
βw,pw
αw
∑
i∈Nw(a)
ri(β,p, a) (CAPA)
s.t.
∑
k∈Kw
pkw ≤ p¯w, p
k
w ≥ 0, β
k
w ∈ Nw(a), ∀ k ∈ Kw.
The optimal solution to this problem can be written in closed form [11]:
(βkw)
∗ = i∗, where i∗ ∈ argmaxi∈Nw(a)
|hki |
2
τnk
i
(pkw)
∗ =
[
λ−
τnki∗
|hk
i∗
|2
]+
λ
(∑
k∈Kw
(
pkw
)∗
− p¯w
)
= 0
(3)
where λ ≥ 0 is the dual variable associated with the power budget constraint. We note that the power
constraint is binding at the optimal solution:
∑
k∈Kw
(pkw)
∗ = p¯w.
With some abuse of notations, we use ri(a) to denote the optimal rate for user i obtained by using
either the CA or CAPA strategy (the actual strategy used will be indicated using a superscript CA or
CAPA when necessary). When a is fixed, we denote the weighted optimal throughput of BS w by:
Rw(a) , αw
∑
i∈Nw(a)
ri(a).
B. The Overall Resource Management Problem: Complexity Status
In this subsection, we investigate the complexity status of the throughput optimization problem (SYS).
A tuple (β∗,p∗,a∗) is an optimal solution of the problem (SYS) only if each BS uses the CAPA strategy.
Although finding the CAPA solution is easy when the user-BS association is fixed, the problem turns
out to be intractable when the association becomes an optimization variable. The proof of this theorem
is provided in the Appendix.
Theorem 1: Finding the optimal solution to the problem (SYS) is strongly NP-hard.
When each BS is restricted to allocate resource by channel assignment only, then the CA strategy is
optimal for the per-BS problem. In this case, the problem (SYS) is still intractable.
6Corollary 1: When the CA strategy is used for resource allocation within each BS, finding the best
BS association that maximizes the system throughput is strongly NP-hard.
The above results establish the complexity status for the problem (SYS) in a general network
configuration. In a special case where each BS operates on a single channel, the problem is equivalent
to a maximum weighted matching problem, which is efficiently solvable.
Corollary 2: When |Kw| = 1, ∀ w ∈ W , problem (SYS) is polynomial time solvable.
III. MECHANISM DESIGN FOR JOINT BS ASSOCIATION AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION
The previous section analyzes the per-BS and the overall resource allocation problem assuming
complete information at the network side. However, in an FDD network, there is an intrinsic asymmetry
in the available information at the BSs and at the users, as the downlink channel and the noise powers
are measured by the users. Strategic (selfish) users can exploit such asymmetry of information for their
own benefit by tampering with the devices if necessary [5]. We now provide a simple illustration of
the potential inefficiency caused by the manipulation of channel state information.
Example 1: Consider the network consisting of 1 BS and 2 users with 3 channels. Let the noise
power nki = 1 for all i, k, and let τ = 1. Assume that the BS has a total power of 3. The channel gains
are listed in Table II.
TABLE II
CHANNEL GAINS FOR EXAMPLE 1.
|h1i |
2 |h2i |
2 |h3i |
2
user 1 (i = 1) 2 2 1
user 2 (i = 2) 0.5 0.5 2
When all the users report truthfully, and when the CA strategy is used, user 1 will be scheduled on
channel 1 and 2, while user 2 will be scheduled on channel 3. A throughput of 3 log(1 + 2) ≈ 3.29
nats/s can be obtained. When user 1 remains truthful but user 2 becomes selfish, and it falsely reports
its channels as (3, 3, 2) (instead of (0.5, 0.5, 2)), the BS will assign all the channels to user 2. After
the channel assignment, the actual rate that user 2 obtains still depends on its true channels 1. Thus a
throughput of 2 log(1 + 0.5) + log(1 + 2) ≈ 1.91 nats/s will be obtained, which is only about 58% of
the optimal system throughput. In contrast, user 2’s untruthful behavior leads to its own rate increase
of over 70%, at the expense of starving user 1. 
A. The VCG mechanism
The optimization of system performance when strategic users have private information can be formu-
lated as a mechanism design problem. Assuming users have quasilinear utility, a system of incentives
(interference taxes) may be put in place in order to align individual users’ preferences with the goal
of optimizing system performance. The goal therefore is to find the interference taxes that support the
implementation of efficient resource allocation in dominant strategies, i.e. for each user, the truthful
revelation of channel state information is optimal regardless of the information reported by all other
users. The search for mechanisms is typically restricted to the class of direct mechanisms in which
users report their private information to a third-party, which in turn allocates resources and implements
a system of incentives via taxes.
1Such rate can be achieved via the use of rateless codes. We refer the readers to [5, Section II] for detailed explanation of
achieving such rate when BSs do not have perfect knowledge of the actual channel.
7The celebrated VCG mechanism achieves this goal by having users report their privately held
information on channel states to a central controller (CU), who computes the globally optimal solution
of (SYS) given the reported information. The CU then assigns the users to the BSs and a given rate
according to the solution of the optimal solution of (SYS). Each user, when attempting to manipulate the
allocation of resources by misreporting channel state information, is penalizes for the deterioration of
system performance for all other users. This is the basis for the VCG mechanism being strategy-proof,
i.e. for each individual user, truthful revelation of channel state information is optimal regardless of the
information reported by all other users. It should be also emphasized here that any other direct and
strategy-proof mechanism implementing the solution to (SYS) is an instance of the VCG mechanism
with interference taxes modified by a constant (see [31, Corollary 5.1]). Unfortunately, in the previous
section we showed that finding the the global optimal solution of (SYS) is an NP-hard problem. Thus,
a computationally tractable direct mechanism cannot be both strategy-proof and efficient.
Our strategy for designing a computationally tractable mechanism is to relax the requirement of op-
timality so that an approximately optimal solution of (SYS) can be implemented in dominant strategies.
In the mechanism proposed below, tractability is achieved by: (i) decentralizing the resource allocation
decisions to each BS and implementing the VCG mechanism in a per BS basis (section III-B below);
(ii) allowing the users to dynamically adjust their choices of association (section III-C below).
B. Implementing VCG at each BS with Fixed Association
We formally describe the implementation of the VCG mechanism for given user-BS association
profile a. Recall that optimal per-BS strategies were described in Section II-A.
Define the normalized channels as hi,w ,
{hki
nk
i
}
k∈Kw
;h−i,w , {hj,w}j∈Nw(a)\i. Let hw , [hi,w,h−i,w].
Define user i’s reported normalized channels as ĥi,w. Define ĥ−i,w and ĥw similarly. When we take
untruthfulness into consideration, a user i’s rate depends on the following two terms: 1) the reported
normalized channel, denoted as ĥw, by which the BS makes the resource allocation decision; 2)
the actual normalized channel hi,w, by which user i experiences the actual rate. We signify such
dependencies by using ri(a;hi,w, ĥw) to denote user i’s rate. If the information reported by the users
is ĥw, a tax Ti(a; ĥw) will be levied upon user i, and its net utility is
Ui(a;hi,w , ĥ−w) = αwri(a;hi,wĥw)− Ti(a; ĥw). (4)
The tax assessed on user i is computed based on the reported channels. It is given as the total rate
improvement that the set of remaining users Nw(a) \ i can obtain if user i leaves BS w:
Ti(a; ĥw) ,
∑
j∈Nw(a−i)
αwrj(a−i; ĥj,w, ĥ−i,w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
optimal throughput when i drops out
−
∑
j∈Nw(a)\i
αwrj(a; ĥj,w, ĥw)︸ ︷︷ ︸
optimal throughput of other users when i is present
. (5)
The tax expressed in (5) ensures that each user has an incentives to act truthfully. To see why this is
note that when all the users truthfully report their channels, BS w can maximize its throughput. For
example, the optimal throughput is better than that achieved when user i reports untruthfully:
ri(a;hi,w, [ĥi,w,h−i,w]) +
∑
j∈Nw(a)\i
rj(a;hj,w, [ĥi,w,h−i,w]) ≤
∑
j∈Nw(a)
rj(a;hj,w,hw) (6)
From this property we can derive the following key inequality
ri(a;hi,w , ĥw) +
∑
j∈Nw(a)\i
rj(a; ĥj,w , ĥw) ≤ ri(a;hi,w , [hi,w, ĥ−i,w]) +
∑
j∈Nw(a)\i
rj(a; ĥj,w, [hi,w, ĥ−i,w]). (7)
8The sum of the two terms in the right hand side of (7) represents the sum rate achieved by all
the users in BS w assuming the actual channels are [hi,w, ĥ−i,w], and the users also truthfully report
[hi,w, ĥ−i,w]. Consequently, this inequality follows from the fact that the BS’s resource management
strategy maximizes the sum rate when the channels are truthfully reported.
Now suppose user i reports untruthfully (i.e., hi,w 6= ĥi,w), then we have
Ui(a;hi,w , ĥw)
(a)
= ri(a;hi,w, ĥw)−
( ∑
j∈Nw(a−i)
rj(a−i; ĥj,w, ĥ−i,w)−
∑
j∈Nw(a)\i
rj(a; ĥj,w, ĥw)
)
(b)
≤ ri(a;hi,w , [hi,w, ĥ−i,w]) +
∑
j∈Nw(a)\i
rj(a; ĥj,w , [hi,w, ĥ−i,w])−
∑
j∈Nw(a−i)
rj(a−i; ĥj,w, ĥ−i,w)
(c)
= Ui(a;hi,w, [hi,w, ĥ−i,w])
where (a) and (c) are from the definitions of the utility in (4); (b) is from (7). We have then established
desired result.
In the reminder of this paper, we will assume that the VCG mechanism is implemented at each BS.
Thus, we will simply write ri(a) instead of ri(a;hi,w, ĥw). The user i’s tax term (5) and utility term (4)
can be simplified as (assuming a[i] = w)
Ti(a) ,
∑
j∈Nw(a−i)
αwrj(a−i)−
∑
j∈Nw(a)\i
αwrj(a) (8)
Ui(a) , αwri(a) − Ti(a) =
∑
j∈Nw(a)
αwrj(a) −
∑
j∈Nw(a−i)
αwrj(a−i). (9)
In summary, by using the VCG mechanism within each BS, all the users will act truthfully, which in
turn allows the BSs to optimally implement their resource allocation strategies. It is important to note
here, that even in the ideal scenario where all the users behave truthfully, the tax and utility function
defined in (8) and (9) are still extremely useful. As will be seen in the subsequent sections, they lead
to simple and efficient network-wide resource allocation.
C. The User-BS Association Game
Suppose users are allowed to autonomously select which BS to connect to. Assuming each BS
implements a VCG mechanism, we are left with a user-BS association game. We will occasionally use
the superscripts CA or CAPA to specify the strategies used by the BSs. Let us define a non-cooperative
BS association game as: G , {N , {χi}i∈N , {Ui(·)}i∈N }, where χi =W is the strategy space of user
i; Ui(·) is the utility of user i as defined in (9).
Interestingly, unlike most conventional games, in game G, the interdependencies of the users’ strate-
gies are only implicitly given. For example, suppose a[i] = w, a[j] = q. In order to assess the impact
of user i’s change of association from BS w to BS q on user j’s utility, BS q’s resource allocation
problem (either CA or CAPA) needs to be solved. There is no closed-form expression governing the
users’ interdependencies. This unique property of the game makes our subsequent analysis, particularly
the efficiency of the NE of game G, very involved.
We first characterize the utility function Ui(a) and the tax function Ti(a).
Proposition 1: When all the BSs use either the CA or the CAPA strategy, Ti(a) ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N .
Moreover, the users’ utility functions are bounded: 0 ≤ Ui(a) ≤ αa[i]ri(a).
Proof: For notational simplicity, let w = a[i] be the association of user i. Suppose that the BSs use the
CA strategy. Observe that as each channel vacated by user i’s departure will be re-assigned to some
user j ∈ Nw(a) \ i, and the assignment of all the other channels remains the same. Consequently, the
9rates of those users that have new channels will increase. This leads to TCAi (a) ≥ 0, which in turn
implies that UCAi (a) ≤ αwrCAi (a). To show UCAi (a) ≥ 0, observe
max
j∈Nw(a)\i
|hkj |
2
nkj
≤ max
j∈Nw(a)
|hkj |
2
nkj
, ∀ k ∈ Kw. (10)
This inequality combined with the monotonicity of the log function and the structure of the solution
for the CA problem (cf. (2)) implies:∑
j∈Nw(a−i)
αwr
CA
j (a−i) ≤
∑
j∈Nw(a)\i
αwr
CA
j (a) + αwr
CA
i (a). (11)
Rearranging terms, and plugging in the definition of tax in (8), we have: αwrCAi (a) − TCAi (a) =
UCAi (a) ≥ 0. The CAPA case can be argued along the same lines. 
D. Characterization of Nash Equilibria
In this subsection we present a series of results characterizing the pure NEs for game G.
For a fixed a, we define BRi(a) as the set of “better-reply” BSs for user i:
BRi(a) ,
{
w|Ui([w, a−i]) > Ui([a[i], a−i]), w ∈ W
}
. (12)
The pure strategy NE of the game G is a profile a∗ in which BRi(a∗) = ∅, ∀ i ∈ N . Equivalently,
all users prefer to stay in their current BSs: Ui (a∗) ≥ maxw∈W Ui
(
[w, a∗−i]
)
, ∀ i ∈ N .
Let R(a) ,
∑
w∈W αwRw(a) denote the weighted system throughput for fixed association a. Our
first result analyzes the existence of the pure NE of game G. The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 2: The game G must admit at least one pure NE. In particular, the association profile
a˜ ∈ argmaxaR(a) must be a pure NE of this game.
The existence of pure NE for the game G could be attributed to the tax charged by the BSs. Without
such tax, there could be no pure NE. To illustrate, define a new game in which users are not charged
with taxation, and their utilities are just their rates: G˜ , {N , {χi}i∈N , {ri(·)}i∈N }. We claim that if
all the BSs use either CA or CAPA strategy, this game does not always admit a pure NE. We show
this claim by giving two counterexamples.
Example 2: When the BSs use CA strategy, consider a network with W = 2, N = 3, αw = 1
and |Kw| = 2, ∀ w. The channel gains are given in the top part of Table III. Let nki = 1, ∀ i, k,
p¯w = 2, ∀ w. When BSs use CAPA strategy, consider a network with W = 2, N = 3, αw = 1 and
|Kw| = 2, ∀ w. The channel gains are given in Table IV. Let nki = 1, ∀ i, k, p¯w = 5, ∀ w. For both
examples, we show in Table V that in every possible association profile, there exists at least one user
whose better-reply set is nonempty. 
TABLE III
CHANNEL GAINS FOR EXAMPLE 2–CA CASE.
CA case |h1i |2 |h2i |2 |h3i |2 |h4i |2
i=1 2 0.1 2.2 0.1
i=2 0.5 2.5 0.1 2.6
i=3 0.1 2.4 2.3 0.2
TABLE IV
CHANNEL GAINS FOR EXAMPLE 2–CAPA CASE.
CAPA case |h1i |2 |h3i |2 |h3i |2 |h4i |2
i=1 15
1
5
1
6.4
1
11
i=2 16 0 0
1
8
i=3 0 14
1
6 0
Example 2 illustrates that it is the interference tax imposed by the BSs that ensures the existence of
the pure NE for game G. In fact, such tax also guarantees the efficiency of the outcome of the game.
Theorem 2 asserts that the maximum weighted throughput achievable by all the NEs is the same as
the optimal system weighted throughput. In the following, we further provide a lower bound for the
efficiency of the NEs. Central to the derivation of such lower bound is certain submodular property of the
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TABLE V
THE BETTER-REPLY SETS FOR USES UNDER DIFFERENT SYSTEM ASSOCIATION PROFILES.
Association Profile Better-Reply Set (CA Example) Better-Reply Set (CAPA Example)
[1, 1, 1] BRCA3 ([1, 1, 1]) = 2 BR
CAPA
2 ([1, 1, 1]) = 2
[1, 1, 2] BRCA2 ([1, 1, 2]) = 2 BR
CAPA
2 ([1, 1, 2]) = 2
[1, 2, 2] BRCA3 ([1, 2, 2]) = 1 BR
CAPA
3 ([1, 2, 2]) = 1
[1, 2, 1] BRCA1 ([1, 2, 1]) = 2 BR
CAPA
1 ([1, 2, 1]) = 2
[2, 2, 1] BRCA2 ([2, 2, 1]) = 1 BR
CAPA
2 ([2, 2, 1]) = 1
[2, 1, 1] BRCA3 ([2, 1, 1]) = 2 BR
CAPA
3 ([2, 1, 1]) = 2
[2, 1, 2] BRCA1 ([2, 1, 2]) = 1 BR
CAPA
1 ([2, 1, 2]) = 1
[2, 2, 2] BRCA1 ([2, 2, 2]) = 1 BR
CAPA
1 ([2, 2, 2]) = 1
per-BS throughput function Rw(·). Note that Rw(a) depends on the association profile a only through
the set of associated users Nw(a). We can then rewrite Rw(a) as Rw(Nw(a)), which is expressed as a
function of the set of associated users. Then we say that Rw(·) is submodular if the following is true
Rw(G ∪ {i}) −Rw(G) ≤ Rw(M∪ {i}) −Rw(M), ∀ i ∈ N , ∀ M ⊆ G ⊆ N . (13)
The submodularity implies that there is a marginal decrease of throughput when the total number of
associated users increases. In [32], Tse and Hanly have shown that for a fixed power allocation policy
without the total power constraint, the capacity of a fading multiple access channel is a submodular
function. However, in our case showing the submodularity of the throughput Rw(·) is much more
involved, as our resource allocation is the solution to the underlying optimization problems, hence it is
dynamic with respect to the set of associated users.
Once the submodularity property is shown, we can utilize a result from Vetta [22] to obtain the desired
lower bound. In particular, reference [22] introduces the notion of valid-utility games, for which lower
bounds for the efficiency of the NE is 12 . We will show that our BS selection game G belongs to the
family of valid-utility games.
Theorem 3: The weighted system throughput achieved in any NE of the game G must be at least half
of that achieved under the optimal user-BS assignment.
Proof: It is easy to check that Rw(·) has a monotonicity property: Rw(M) ≤ Rw(G), ∀ M ⊆ G. We then
claim that Rw(·) satisfies (13). We only give proof for the (more difficult) CAPA case, the CA case
is a straightforward extension. For simplicity of notations, we let BS w operate on all channels K, set
nkj = 1 for all j, k, and let αw = 1.
Fix two sets M,G with M ⊆ G, fix an arbitrary user i with arbitrary channel gains. Define three
vectors g,m,h ∈ RK+ , with their elements given as
g[k] = max
j∈G
|hkj |
2, m[k] = max
j∈M
|hkj |
2, h[k] = |hki |
2. (14)
Note g and m represent the best channel gain on each channel for the set of users G and M,
respectively. From the fact that M⊆ G, we have that m ≤ g. Note that the throughput obtained by BS
w using the CAPA strategy is dependent on the set of associated users only through the best channel
vector. As a result, we can also express Rw(G) as Rw(g), and Rw(G ∪ {i}) as Rw(g ∨ h). In this
notation, the submodular property (13) is equivalent to
Rw(g ∨ h)−Rw(g) ≤ R(m ∨ h)− Rw(m), ∀ h ≥ 0, g ≥m ≥ 0. (15)
In the same token, the monotonicity of Rw(·) can be expressed as
Rw(g) ≥ Rw(m), ∀ g ≥m ≥ 0. (16)
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We then present a sufficient condition for (15) which is easier to verify. Let ek be a K× 1 unit vector
with its kth element being 1. Write h =
∑K
k=1 ekh[k]. Then we have
Rw(g ∨ h)−Rw(g) =
[
Rw(g ∨
K∑
k=1
ekh[k])−Rw(g ∨
K−1∑
k=1
ekh[k])
]
+ · · ·+
[
Rw(g ∨ e1h[1])−Rw(g)
]
Rw(m ∨ h)−Rw(m) =
[
Rw(m ∨
K∑
k=1
ekh[k])−Rw(m ∨
K−1∑
k=1
ekh[k])
]
+ · · ·+
[
Rw(m ∨ e1h[1])−Rw(m)
]
.
In order for (15) to be true, it is sufficient that for all k ∈ K, the following is true
Rw(g ∨ ekh[k])−Rw(g) ≤ Rw(m ∨ ekh[k])−Rw(m), ∀ h ≥ 0, g ≥m ≥ 0. (17)
Condition (17) allows us to verify the submodular condition on a channel by channel basis. Partition
the set K into two sets: Q = {k|m[k] = g[k]}, Q = {k|m[k] < g[k]}. We can show that (17) is true
for all k ∈ Q and k ∈ Q. The proof for this result is given in the Appendix.
To this point we have shown that Rw(·) is submodular and monotone. From Proposition 1 we have
that
∑
w
∑
i∈Nw(a)
Ui(a) ≤
∑
wRw(a). Additionally, the definition of Ui(·) ensures that it is equal to
the difference of the system throughput with and without user i (cf. (9)). As a result, game G is a valid
utility game, and we can apply [22, Theorem 3] to deduce that any NE of the game achieves at least
a half of the optimal weighted throughput. This completes the proof. 
We emphasize that all the results derived in Section III-C and III-D hold true regardless of the
presence of the untruthful users, as long as the BSs implement the taxation for each user as specified
in (8) and (9). This is because the association game G is built upon the assumption that the BSs use
the VCG mechanism, and that the users are always truthful.
IV. A DYNAMIC MECHANISM
In this section we introduce a mechanism that allows the users and the BSs to jointly compute a
NE of the game G, which is a high quality solution for the joint BS selection and resource allocation
problem. All the results in this section are applicable to both games GCA and GCAPA. Suppose each
user maintains a length M memory that operates in a first in first out fashion. Each user’s memory is
used to store its best associations in the last M iterations.
We first briefly describe the main steps of the proposed mechanism. It alternates between a BS
optimization step and a user optimization step. When it is the BSs’ turn to act, based on the current set
of associated users, each of the BSs optimally allocates the resources in its own cell using the VCG
mechanism (cf. Section II-A and III-B). From the system perspective, in this step, the tuple (β,p)
is updated while holding the association a fixed. When it is the users’ turn to act, each of them first
computes its current best BS (in terms of achieved individual utility) according to the current association
profile. It then pushes the best BS into its memory, and randomly samples one BS from its memory
for actual association. As we will see later, in this step, a is updated while fixing (β,p). The sampling
step is the key to establish the convergence of the proposed mechanism. The proposed mechanism is
detailed in Table VI, where the superscript (t) denotes the iteration number.
One benefit of the proposed mechanism is that it allows the users to update at the same time without
explicit coordination of their update sequences. A possible alternative is a sequential implementation
that allows a single user to update in each iteration. However such scheme is undesirable as it requires
significant coordination efforts among all the users/BSs.
An important feature of the mechanism is that each of its steps can be implemented in a distributed
fashion. The following two assumptions on the network are needed for such purpose:
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TABLE VI
THE PROPOSED MECHANISM
S1) Initialization: Let t=0, let the users choose their nearest BSs.
S2) BS Optimization: Based on current a(t), each BS implements a VCG mechanism.
S3) User Optimization: For each user i ∈ N
S3-1) Compute the Best BS: Compute BRi(a(t)); If BRi(a(t)) 6= ∅,
randomly select w∗(t)i ∈ BRi(a(t)); otherwise, set w
∗(t)
i = a
(t)[i]
S3-2) Update Memory: Shift w∗(t)i into the front of the memory;
if t ≥M , shift w∗(t−M)i out from the end of the memory
S3-3) Determine the Next BS Association: Uniformly sample the user i’s memory;
obtain a BS index as a(t+1)[i]
S4) Continue: If a(t+1) = a(t+1−m) for m = 1, · · · ,M , stop.
Otherwise, let t=t+1, go to S2).
1) Local channel information is known by each BS. That is, each BS w has the knowledge of{
|hki |
2
}
k∈Kw,i∈N
, but not the channels related to other BSs. Note that in an FDD system, this
information is obtained via user feedback, the truthfulness of which is ensured by implementing
the per-BS VCG mechanism;
2) Each BS has a feedback channel to all the potential users.
Under the above assumptions, the mechanism can be implemented distributedly. In the BSs’ optimization
step, the BSs compute the taxes and perform their per-cell resource allocation (cf. Section II-A and
III-B). They are not required to have the knowledge of the operational conditions or channel states
related to other BSs. In the users’ optimization step, to compute the set BRi(a(t)), each user i needs
to know Ui([w,a(t)−i]), ∀ w (cf. (12)). Each of these quantities can be expressed as
Ui([w, a
(t)
−i ]) = αwri([w, a
(t)
−i])− Ti([w, a
(t)
−i ]). (18)
Both terms in (18) can be computed by BS w and fed back to user i. To compute the first term in
(18), BS w solves its resource allocation problem with the set of users Nw([w,a(t)−i]). To obtain the
second term in (18), BS w solves its per-cell problem with and without user i (cf. (9)). Again only local
channel states are needed. It is important to note that to carry out the proposed mechanism, the users
do not need to know the behaviors of their counterparts. They only need the “summary” information
(the tax and the rate estimates) from the BSs.
In practice, the users may only switch to a new BS if it offers significantly higher utility, because
each of such switch induces costs such as message passing. Let us use ci to denote such cost for user
i. When switching costs are included into the decision process, in each iteration of the mechanism,
w∗ ∈ BRi(a
(t)) implies Ui([w∗,a(t)−i]) > Ui(a(t)) + ci. This modification could reduce the number of
iterations needed for convergence (since the users are now less willing to change association), but could
also reduce the system throughput achieved by the identified NE.
The convergence property of the proposed mechanism is provided in the following theorem. The
details of the proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Theorem 4: When choosing M ≥ N , the BS association mechanism produces a sequence
{
a(t)
}∞
t=1
that converges to a NE of game G with probability 1 (w.p.1).
V. DISCUSSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
To this point we have assumed that the BSs are interested in maximizing the per-BS throughput. Such
assumption allows the BSs to have closed-form solution to their optimization problems, and it leads to
important properties such as submodularity of the throughput functions. Our work can be extended to
cases where the BSs allocate resources using general utility functions as well.
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First we mention that all the previous properties of the mechanism can be straightforwardly gener-
alized to the case where each BS w aims to maximize a weighted throughput of the form
∑
i∈Nw
γiri.
The set of weights {γi ≥ 0}Ni=1 can be adjusted adaptively by the BSs over time to ensure fairness
among the users’ time-averaged transmission rates (see e.g., [33]).
Consider an alternative case in which BS w is interested in finding the best channel assignment to
achieve the proportional fairness (PF). The per-BS problem is then given by [10]
max
βw
∑
i∈Nw(a)
αw log (ri(β,p, a)) (CA-PF)
s.t. βkw ∈ Nw(a), ∀ k ∈ Kw.
This problem generally does not admit a closed-form solution, and the BS needs to perform numerical
search to obtain the optimal solutions (see [10] for a set of efficient search algorithms). Let us use
rPFi (a) to denote the resulting transmission rate for user i. Following (9), each user i in cell w has the
following utility UPFi (a) , αw log(rPFi (a)) − TPFi (a), where TPFi (a) , αw
∑
j∈Nw(a−i)
log(rPFj (a−i)) −
αw
∑
j∈Nw(a)\i
log(rPFj (a)). We can now construct a PF association game GPF with each user’s utility
function given as UPFi (·). Similarly as in Theorem 2, we can show that the optimal association profile
a∗ = argmaxa
∑
w αw
∑
i∈Nw(a)
log(rPFi (a)) must be a NE of this game. Our proposed mechanism
can be applied for finding the NE of this game.
In general, most of the properties of the mechanism (except for the efficiency lower bounds of the
NE) can be extended to networks with the following properties: 1) The BSs operate independently
(using orthogonal time/frequencey resources); 2) The utility function chosen by each BS is separable
among the associated users; 3) The optimal solutions of the per-BS optimization problem can be found.
However, it is not clear at this point whether the monotonicity and the submodularity conditions can
be carried over to the case of general utility functions. Showing such properties under general utility
functions is left as a future work.
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present simulation results to demonstrate the performance of the proposed algo-
rithm. Both indoor and outdoor network scenarios are considered.
A. An Indoor Network Scenario
We have the following settings for this part of the simulation. Let us denote a 50m×50m indoor area
as A; denote the 25m×25m central area of A as C; define the border of A as B. Define the parameter
0 ≤ D ≤ 1 as the distribution factor of the users/BSs: 1) D×100% of the users and BSs are randomly
placed in A; 2) the rest of the users are randomly placed in C and the rest of the BSs are randomly placed
on B. When D is small, the subset of BSs that are located at the center of the area become hotspots
and are likely to be congested. See Fig. 1 for an illustration. Let di,w denote the distance between
user i and BS w. The channels between user i and BS w, {hki }k∈Kw , are generated independently
from the complex Gaussian distribution CN (0, σ2i,w), with σ2i,w = Li,w/PLi,w. The random variable
Li,w models the shadowing effect, i.e., 10 log 10(Li,w) ∼ N (0, 64) is a real Gaussian random variable.
The variable PLi,w is the pathloss between BS w and user i. To model the pathloss in the indoor
scenario, the office environment model [34] is used. The key simulation parameters are given in Table
VII. The performance of the proposed algorithm will be compared with the algorithm that first assigns
the users to their nearest BSs, and then optimally perform the per-BS resource allocation. Note that
this algorithm separates the process of association and per-cell resource allocation, hence in most cases
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TABLE VII
SIMULATION PARAMETERS FOR THE INDOOR NETWORK.
Parameters Values Parameters Values
p¯w 23 dBm Total Bandwidth 80MHz
Pass Loss (dB) PLi,w = PL(1) + 26 log 10(di,w1 ) + 14.1 αw 1
BER 10−6 Length of Memory 10
Operating Frequency 1.9 GHz Noise Power −100 dBm/Hz
gives degraded system performance. Throughout this subsection, the CAPA strategy will be adopted
for per-BS resource allocation.
The first set of experiments evaluate the convergence performance of the proposed mechanism. Fig.
2 plots 3 realizations of the evolution of system throughput. This figure demonstrates the ability of
the algorithm to “track” the equilibrium solutions. The algorithm takes a few iterations to converge to
new equilibria when the following events occur at iteration 100: 1) 10 (randomly placed) new/old users
enter/leave the system; 2) all of the users’ channel gains are re-generated (with the locations of the
users and BSs unchanged).
In Fig. 3, we evaluate the averaged convergence time for the algorithm. We highlight its “tracking”
ability by adding a number of new users and by randomly re-generating all the users’ channel gains
after an equilibrium has been reached. The algorithm is able to track the equilibrium much faster than
performing a complete restart. In Fig. 4, we plot the averaged convergence time of the algorithm with
N = 30, K = 512. We observe that the convergence time is decreasing with D. This phenomenon is
intuitive because when D is close to 1, the event of congestion is less likely to happen as on average
the communication load is evenly distributed among the BSs. On the contrary, when D becomes small,
those BSs located in the interior of the area are likely to be congested. Large portions of the users will
then seek for alternative choices, which results in longer convergence time. Additionally, when taking
the switching costs into consideration, the algorithm converges significantly faster.
The second set of experiments intend to evaluate the throughput performance of the proposed
algorithm. We first investigate a relatively small network with 10 users, 64 channels and 1 − 4 BSs,
and compare the performance of the proposed algorithms to the global optimal solution of the problem
(SYS) (obtained by an exhaustive search). The results are shown in Fig. 5. We see that the proposed
algorithm, abbreviated as Distributed BS Association (DBSA), performs well with little throughput loss.
In contrast, the nearest BS algorithm performs poorly.
We then evaluate the performance of the algorithm in larger networks with 30 users, up to 8 BSs and
512 channels. Fig. 6 shows the comparison of the averaged performance of the proposed algorithm and
the nearest BS algorithm. Due to the prohibitive computation time required, we are unable to obtain
the optimal system throughput in this case. We instead compute a (strict) upper bound of the maximum
throughput assuming that the users can connect to multiple BSs simultaneously. We refer to this as the
multiple-connectivity network. We also observe that when we take the switching costs into consideration
(ci = 1 Mbps for all i), there is a slight decrease in system throughput.
In Fig. 7, we show the distribution of the per-BS rates achieved by the proposed algorithm and
the nearest BS algorithm. From the figure we see that the proposed algorithm is able to distribute the
throughput to different BSs fairly, while the nearest BSs algorithm may result in severe unbalance of
the BSs’ loads (some BSs may experience heavy traffic while the rest of the BSs may become idle).
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B. An Outdoor Multicell Cellular Network Scenario
In this section we demonstrate the performance of the proposed algorithm in a multicell OFDMA cel-
lular network. Standard cellular network parameters are used for the simulation, see Table VIII 2. Again
frequency selective channels with a Rayleigh fading component and 8 dB log-normal fading component
are simulated. Users are assumed to be distributed uniformly in the entire network. Throughout this
subsection, the system level PF objective is optimized, thus the CA-PF strategy discussed in Section
V is used for the per-BS resource allocation. The solution to the problem (CA-PF) is computed using
Algorithm 1 in [10]. The main purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the performance of the proposed
algorithm when some of the key assumptions guaranteeing the theoretical properties of the algorithm
no longer hold true. Note that in order for the proposed algorithm to work in this network setting,
inter-cell interference should be treated as noise. That is, user i’s noise power on channel k, nki , should
include both the environmental noise power and the inter-cell interference power.
TABLE VIII
SIMULATION PARAMETERS FOR THE OUTDOOR NETWORK
Parameters Values
Cell layout Hexagonal, 7 cells, 3 sectors per cell
BS-BS distance 2.8 km
Frequency Reuse 1
p¯w 49 dBm
Pass Loss Model (dB) PLi,w = 128.1 + 36.7 log 10(di,w)
BER 10−6
Total Bandwidth 10 MHz
Noise Power −169 dBm/Hz
Multipath Time Delay Profile ITU-R M.1225 PedA
Number of channel (FFT size) 64
Length of Individual Memory M = 10
We first show the convergence of the algorithm. In the considered cellular network, different BSs
transmit using the same spectrum bands. Consequently our theoretical analysis of the convergence is
no longer valid. However, convergence is still observed empirically. See Table IX for the comparison
of the convergence speed with and without the switching costs {ci}.
We then demonstrate the throughput performance of the algorithm. We compare the proposed al-
gorithm with the nearest BS algorithm and the “Greedy-0” algorithm proposed in [35], which is a
centralized algorithm that finds a good user-BS association by successively perturbing the user-BS
association locally. In Table X and Fig. 9, we see that the proposed algorithm compares favorably with
the other algorithms both in terms of system throughput and fairness levels. Each entry in the table is
obtained via an average of 200 randomly generated networks.
TABLE IX
THE AVERAGED NUMBER OF ITERATIONS FOR CONVERGENCE
DBSA DBSA ci = 0.1 Mbps DBSA ci = 0.5 Mbps
N=10 55 33 21
N=30 65 38 25
N=50 70 40 23
2Most of the network parameters are taken from [33]. In the present work only single antenna systems are simulated.
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TABLE X
COMPARISON OF THE SYSTEM THROUGHPUT OF DIFFERENT ALGORITHMS
DBSA DBSA (ci = 0.1 Mbps) DBSA (ci = 0.5 Mbps) Greedy-0 Nearest
N=20 97.86 Mbps 93.08 Mbps 90.13 Mbps 82.23 Mbps 63.31 Mbps
N=40 117.9 Mbps 115.1 Mbps 109.3 Mbps 105.7 Mbps 89.0 Mbps
N=60 135.9 Mbps 129.9 Mbps 125.1 Mbps 119.5 Mbps 104.8 Mbps
Additionally, we evaluate the performance of the algorithm when only noisy channel information is
available. In particular, we consider the situation in which the normalized channel magnitude estimated
by the users is subject to a zero mean estimation error [36], [37]. Let |h˜ki |2 , |h
k
i |
2
nki
+ ǫki denote
the estimated normalized channel magnitude by user i on channel k, where ǫki ∼ N (0, (σki )2) is
the estimation error. Suppose the estimated normalized channels are used by the BSs for resource
allocation. To evaluate the performance loss due to the channel inaccuracy, similarly as in [38], we
introduce a term called Channel Error Ratio (CER) to quantify the strength of the channel error:
CERki , 10 log10
(
|hki |
2
nki (σ
k
i )
2
)
. In Fig. 10, we plot the system throughput performance with different
values of the CER. We observe that the overall throughput degrades slightly with such inaccurate
channel information.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied a resource management problem in a multi-cell network in the presence of
strategic/selfish users. We propose a novel mechanism that implements a strategy-proof and approxi-
mately optimal scheme in dominant strategies. Utilizing a key submodularity property of the per-BS
throughput function, we characterized the efficiency of the proposed mechanism. As a future work, we
will study the case in which there is limited (low rate) feedback from the users to the BSs. In this case
feedback strategy needs to be designed in conjunction with the BSs’ and the users’ strategies. A new
approximation ratio needs to be derived for this more practical scenario. We also plan to generalize the
submodularity property to other utility functions and to the case of MIMO networks. Another interesting
extension of the current work is to include the users that are hostile instead of non-cooperative. Strategies
that are different from pricing are needed in this case to counter the untruthfulness induced by the
hostility.
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IX. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Without loss of generality, we consider the case where αw = 1, nki = 1,∀ w, k, i. This claim is
proved based on a polynomial time transformation from 3-SAT problem, which is a known NP-complete
problem. The 3-SAT problem is described as follows. Given Q disjunctive clauses C1 · · · , CQ defined
on M Boolean variables X1 · · · ,XM , i.e., Cq = T 1q ∨T 2q ∨T 3q with T
j
q ∈ {X1, · · · ,XM , X¯1, · · · , X¯M},
the question is to check whether there exists a truth assignment for the Boolean variables such that all
clauses are satisfied. Define π(Cq) as the set of terms contained in clause Cq, and define I(T ) as the
index of a term T ’s corresponding variable, i.e., if Cm = X¯1 ∨ X¯2 ∨X4, then π(Cm) = {X¯1, X¯2,X4},
and I(X¯1) = 1.
Given any instance of 3-SAT problem with Q clauses and M variables, we construct an instance
of the multi-BS network with (2Q + 1)M users and 2M +Q BSs. For each variable Xm, we do the
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following: 1) associate with it two variable BSs Xm, X¯m; 2) associate with it (2Q+ 1) variable users
{x1m, · · · , x
Q
m}, {x¯1m, · · · , x¯
Q
m} and ym; 3) set the individual maximum power of the BSs Xm, X¯m to
be Q, respectively; 4) let each of the BSs Xm, X¯m operate on Q channels. For each clause Cq we do
the following: 1) associate with it a single BS Cq; 2) set the maximum power of BS Cq to be 1; 3)
let BS Cq operate on a single channel. Denote the kth channel in the set Kw as Kw(k). The channel
gains between various users and BSs are given as follows.
|hkym |
2 =
{
3, w = Xm or w = X¯m, ∀ k ∈ Kw
0, otherwise, |h
k
x
q
m
|2 =

2, w = Xm, k = Kw(q)
1, w = Cq, Xm ∈ π(Cq), ∀ k ∈ Kw
0, otherwise,
|hkx¯qm |
2 =

2, w = X¯m, k = Kw(q)
1, w = Cq, with X¯m ∈ π(Cq), ∀ k ∈ Kw
0, otherwise.
(19)
For example, for a clause Cq = X1 ∨ X¯2 ∨X3, the constructed network is shown in Fig. 11.
In the following, for notational simplicity, for a term T ∈ π(Cq), we will use the short hand notation
T to denote its corresponding variable BSs (instead of XI(T ) or X¯I(T )), use the notation yI(T ) and
{t1I(T ), · · · , t
Q
I(T )} for its corresponding variable users. Take an arbitrary clause Cq and a term T ∈
π(Cq). Two important observations can be made at this point. Both of them are the direct consequence
of our network construction, and we omit their proofs due to space limitation.
Observation 1: If at the optimal solution, BS T selects its corresponding variable user yI(T ) for
transmission, then the subset of variable users {t1I(T ), · · · , t
Q
I(T )} will not be selected by BS T at the
optimal solution. A direct consequence of this observation is that the maximum throughput that the BS
pair T, T¯ can achieve is 2Q+Q log 3.
Observation 2: Assuming T ∈ π(Cq), then the maximum throughput achievable by the BSs {T, T¯ , Cq}
is 2Q+Q log 3 + 1. This throughput is achieved if and only if BS T selects user yI(T ), BS T¯ selects
users {t¯1I(T ), · · · , t¯
Q
I(T )} and BS Cq selects the user t
q
I(T ).
Our main claim is that the given 3-SAT instance is satisfiable if and only if the constructed network
achieves a throughput of at least Q+ 2MQ+MQ log 3.
Suppose the 3-SAT problem is satisfiable. Then for each clause Cq there is a term T ∗q ∈ π(Cq)
such that T ∗q = 1. Let the variable BS T ∗q select user yI(T ∗q ), let the variable BS T¯
∗
q select all users
{t¯1I(T ∗q )
, · · · , t¯QI(T ∗q )
}, and let the clause BS q select the variable user tqI(T ∗q ). By Observation 2, the total
throughput of variable BSs T ∗q , T¯ ∗q and the clause Bs Cq is 2Q+Q log 3 + 1. As a result, the overall
system throughput is 2MQ+QM log 3 +Q.
Conversely, suppose a throughput of 2MQ+MQ log 3+Q is achieved. From Observation 1 we see
that the maximum throughput for a variable BS pair Xm, X¯m is 2Q+Q log 3. As we have M variable
BS pairs and Q clause BSs, then each clause BS must achieve throughput 1 in order for the system to
achieve the throughput M(2Q + Q log 3) + Q. Observation 2 implies that this is only possible if for
each clause BS Cq, there is at least one clause BS, say T ∗q ∈ π(Cq) that transmits to the corresponding
variable user yI(T ∗q ). Set {T
∗
q }
Q
q=1 all to 1, then each clause Cq will be satisfied. Consequently, the
resulting 3-SAT problem is satisfied.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We prove this theorem by contradiction. Suppose a∗ ∈ argmaxaR(a), but a∗ is not a pure NE. Then
there must exist a user i such that BRi(a∗) 6= ∅. Choose w˜ ∈ BRi(a∗), and define a new association
profile a˜ = [w˜, a∗−i]. Let w∗ = a∗[i]. We show that user i’s unilateral change of association has the
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same effect on its own utility as well as on the system throughput
Ui(a˜)− Ui(a
∗)
(a)
=
∑
j∈Nw˜(a˜)
αw˜rj(a˜)−
∑
j∈Nw˜(a˜−i)
αw˜rj(a˜−i)−
( ∑
j∈Nw∗ (a∗)
αw∗rj(a
∗)−
∑
j∈Nw∗ (a
∗
−i
)
αw∗rj(a
∗
−i)
)
(b)
=
( ∑
j∈Nw˜(a˜)
αw˜rj(a˜) +
∑
j∈Nw∗ (a˜−i)
αw∗rj(a˜−i)
)
−
( ∑
j∈Nw∗ (a∗)
αw∗rj(a
∗) +
∑
j∈Nw˜(a
∗
−i
)
αw˜rj(a
∗
−i)
)
(c)
=
∑
w∈W
αw (Rw(a˜)−Rw(a
∗)) = R(a˜)−R(a∗) (20)
where (a) is from the definition of the utility function (9) ; (b) is due to the fact that a∗−i = a˜−i; (c)
is due to Nw∗(a˜−i) = Nw∗(a˜), Nw˜(a˜−i) = Nw˜(a∗), and Rw(a˜) = Rw(a∗), ∀ w 6= w˜, w∗. From the
assumption, user i prefers to switch to BS w˜, then Ui(a˜) > Ui(a∗). This combined with (20) yields
R(a˜) > R(a∗), which is a contradiction to the optimality of a∗. Then we have a∗ ∈ argmaxaR(a) is
a NE for game G. 
C. Proof of Theorem 3
We show that (17) is true for all k ∈ Q and k ∈ Q.
Step 1) We first argue that for all k ∈ Q, (17) is true. When h[k] ≤ m[k] = g[k], (17) is trivially
true as both sides of it evaluate to zero. We then focus on the case h[k] > m[k] = g[k].
Assuming h[k] > m[k] = g[k], we have that
g ∨ ekh[k] = m ∨ ekh[k] = g+ c× ek
for some constant c ≥ 0. Thus, for all k ∈ Q and h[k] > m[k] = g[k], to show the inequality (17), it
suffices to show the following decreasing difference property
Rw(g+ δ × ek)−Rw(g) ≤ Rw(m+ δ × ek)−Rw(m), ∀ δ ≥ 0, and g ≥m ≥ 0. (21)
From [39], we know that whenever the function Rw(x) is differentiable with respect to x[k], the
decreasing difference property of (21) is equivalent to the following property
lim
δ→0
Rw(g + δ × ek)−Rw(g)
δ
−
Rw(m+ δ × ek)−Rw(m)
δ
≤ 0, ∀ g ≥m ≥ 0. (22)
In what follows, we prove that for any k with h[k] > m[k] = g[k], the limit in (22) exists and is
non-positive. To this end, a closer look at the function Rw(·) is necessary. Let pkg denote the power
allocation for channel k when the best channel gain vector is g, and let λg denote the corresponding
dual variable. From the CAPA strategy, we have that pk
g
= [λg −
1
g[k] ]
+
. Define the active channel set
as Kg , {k|λg −
1
g[k] ≥ 0}. From the fact that the power constraint must be active for the CAPA
strategy, we have that
∑K
k=1 p
k
g
=
∑
k∈Kg
λg −
1
g[k] = p¯w, which implies that
λg =
1
|Kg|
p¯w + ∑
k∈Kg
1
g[k]
 . (23)
Using this expression as well as the expression for pk
g
, we have that
Rw(g) = |Kg| log
(
p¯w +
∑
k∈Kg
1
g[k]
|Kg|
)
+
∑
k∈Kg
log(g[k]) = |Kg| log (λg) +
∑
k∈Kg
log(g[k]). (24)
We argue that when m ≤ g, we must have λg ≤ λm. Otherwise, if λg > λm, due to the fact that
1
g[k] ≤
1
m[k] , we must have pkg > pkm, ∀ k ∈ Km, which implies
∑
k∈Km
pk
g
>
∑
k∈Km
pk
m
= p¯w, a violation
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of the total power constraint.
Take any channel k∗ with h[k∗] > m[k∗] = g[k∗], and define the best channel gains after the increase
on channel k∗ as m∗ = m+ ek∗ × δ and g∗ = g+ ek∗ × δ, respectively. Let Km∗ and Kg∗ denote the
set of active channels. Comparing Km and Km∗ , we have the following four cases: m1) there exists
an ǫ > 0 such that for all 0 ≤ δ ≤ ǫ, Km = Km∗ ; m2) for all δ > 0, Km ⊃ Km∗ ; m3) for all δ > 0,
Km ⊂ Km∗ ; m4) for all δ > 0, Km 6= Km∗ . Similarly, we have four cases g1)–g4) comparing the sets
Kg and Kg∗ . In the following we give the expression for limδ→0 Rw(m+δ×ek)−Rw(m)δ for each of the
cases m1)–m4).
We first consider case m1). In the neighborhood of 0 < δ ≤ ǫ, Rw(m∗) can be expressed as
Rw(m
∗) = |Km| log
(
p¯w +
∑
k∈Km
1
m∗[k]
|Km|
)
+
∑
k∈Km
log(m∗[k]), ∀ 0 ≤ δ ≤ ǫ.
Consequently, in the neighborhood of 0 < δ ≤ ǫ, we have
lim
δ→0+
Rw(m
∗)−Rw(m)
δ
= −
|Km|(
1
m[k∗] )
2
p¯w +
∑
k∈Km
1
m[k]
+
1
m[k∗]
= −
1
λm
1
(m[k∗])2
+
1
m[k∗]
. (25)
We then consider case m2). This case is shown by 4 steps.
Step (m2-1): We first show k∗ ∈ Km. If on the contrary, λm − 1m[k∗] < 0, then due to the continuity
of pk∗
m
with respect to m, there must exist an ǫ > 0 such that for all 0 < δ < ǫ, pk∗
m∗
< 0, which
is equivalent to λm∗ − 1m∗[k∗] < 0. This implies Km = Km∗ for 0 < δ < ǫ, which contradicts the
assumption that Km ⊃ Km∗ , ∀ δ > 0.
Step (m2-2) We then argue that k∗ ∈ Km∗ . Assume the contrary, then λm∗ − 1m∗[k∗] < 0 . From the
previous step, we see that λm− 1m[k∗] ≥ 0. Then it must be the case that λm > λm∗ . Due to the fact that
for all other channels k 6= k∗, m[k] = m∗[k], then we must have p¯w =
∑K
k=1 p
k
m
>
∑K
k=1 p
k
m∗
= p¯w,
a contradiction.
Step (m2-3) We have argued that k∗ must remain in the active set. Then for ǫ small enough, there
must exist a single channel k˜ 6= k∗ such that k˜ ∈ Km but k˜ /∈ Km∗ , for all 0 ≤ δ ≤ ǫ3. The dual
variables λm and λm∗ can be expressed as
λm =
1
|Km|
(
p¯w +
∑
k∈Km
1
m[k]
)
, λm∗ =
1
|Km| − 1
(
p¯w +
∑
k∈Km\{k˜,k∗}
1
m[k]
+
1
m[k∗] + δ
)
. (26)
The difference between the above two dual variables is given by
0
(a)
≤ λm − λm∗ =
−λm +
1
m[k˜]
+ 1
m[k∗] −
1
m[k∗]+δ
|Km| − 1
(27)
where (a) is from the fact that m∗ ≥ m, and use the same argument in the paragraph following
(24). Note that k˜ ∈ Km, then λm − 1
m[k˜]
≥ 0. Combine this with (27), we have that 1
m[k∗] −
1
m[k∗]+δ ≥
λm −
1
m[k˜]
≥ 0 for arbitrary small δ > 0. Then it must be true that λm − 1
m[k˜]
= 0.
Step (m2-4) Using the result obtained in Step (m2-3) and the rate expression (24), we can express
3If for all δ > 0, multiple channels leave Km, then they must have the same magnitude–a probability 0 event. Our argument
can also be applied to this degenerate case, but for the sake of notational simplicity, we only present the single k˜ case.
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the difference of the rate Rw(m∗) and Rw(m) as
Rw(m
∗)−Rw(m)
(a)
= (|Km| − 1) log
( (p¯w +∑k∈Km\{k˜,k∗} 1m[k] + 1m[k∗]+δ )|Km|m[k˜]
(|Km| − 1)|Km|
)
+ log
(
m[k∗] + δ
m[k∗]
)
(b)
= (|Km| − 1) log
( |Km|+ m(k˜)m[k∗]+δ − m[k˜]m[k∗] − 1
|Km| − 1
)
+ log
(
m[k∗] + δ
m[k∗]
)
= (|Km| − 1) log
(
1 +
m[k˜]
m[k∗]+δ −
m[k˜]
m[k∗]
|Km| − 1
)
+ log
(
m[k∗] + δ
m[k∗]
)
(28)
where in (a), (b) we have used the fact that λm = 1
m[h˜]
. Using L’Hopital’s rule, we obtain
lim
δ→0+
Rw(m
∗)−Rw(m)
δ
= lim
δ→0+
− m[k˜](m[k∗]+δ)2
1 + 1|Km|−1
m[k˜]
m[k∗]+δ −
m[k˜]
m[k∗]
+
1
(m[k∗] + δ)
= −
m[k˜]
(m[k∗])2
+
1
m[k∗]
= −
1
λm
1
(m[k∗])2
+
1
m[k∗]
. (29)
For the cases m3)–m4), the derivation is similar to the cases of m1)– m2). The key observation is still
that the channel k∗ must satisfy k∗ ∈ Km and k∗ ∈ Km∗ , and that the channel k˜ that leaves or joins
the set Km∗ must satisfy λm = 1
m[k˜]
. For these cases, (29) again holds true.
Fix δ < 0, and redo the above analysis by switching the role of m and m∗ for all four possible
cases, we can obtain limδ→0− Rw(m
∗)−Rw(m)
δ
= − 1
λm
1
(m[k∗])2 +
1
m[k∗] . Consequently, we have that for all
k∗ that satisfies h[k∗] > m[k∗] = g[k∗], the following is true
lim
δ→0
Rw(m + ek∗ × δ)−Rw(m)
δ
= −
1
λm
1
(m[k∗])2
+
1
m[k∗]
, ∀ g ≥m ≥ 0. (30)
For case g1)-g4), the exact same argument leads to the same result. In summary, we obtain
lim
δ→0
Rw(g
∗)−Rw(g)
δ
−
Rw(m
∗)−Rw(m)
δ
= −
1
λg
1
(g[k∗])2
+
1
g[k∗]
+
1
λm
1
(m[k∗])2
−
1
m[k∗]
. (31)
Recall that k∗ ∈ Q, which means that m[k∗] = g[k∗]. Using the fact that g ≥ m, and λg ≤ λm, we
conclude that (22) is true for all k with h[k] > m[k] = g[k].
Step 2) We then argue that for any channel k ∈ Q, (17) must be true. For any g ≥ m ≥ 0, pick
k ∈ Q, we have the following three cases: 1) h[k] ≤ m[k]; 2) m[k] < h[k] < g[k]; 3) h[k] ≥ g[k].
Verifying case 1)–case 2) is straightforward. For case 3) we have
Rw(m ∨ ekh[k])−Rw(m) = Rw(m ∨ ekh[k])−Rw(m ∨ ekg[k]) +Rw(m ∨ ekg[k])−Rw(m)
≥ Rw(m ∨ ekh[k])−Rw(m ∨ ekg[k]) (32)
where the inequality is due to the monotonicity property. It is sufficient to show
Rw(g ∨ ekh[k])−Rw(g) ≤ Rw(m ∨ ekh[k])−Rw(m ∨ ekg[k]), ∀ h ≥ 0, g ≥m ≥ 0. (33)
Let m˜ = m ∨ ekg[k] and h = g + δkek, for some δk > 0. Clearly m˜[k] = g[k]. Then to show (33),
it is sufficient to show that for all k such that m˜[k] = g[k], we have
Rw(g + ekδk)−Rw(g) ≤ Rw(m˜+ ekδk)−Rw(m˜), ∀ δ ≥ 0,g ≥ m˜ ≥ 0 (34)
which reduces to the case in Step 1) (cf. condition (21)). We also have that (17) is true.
Combining with our argument in Step 1), we conclude that (17) is true for all k ∈ K.
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D. Proof of Theorem 4
Let c(t) denote the better-reply association at time t: c(t)[i] = w∗(t)i . Define two sets C and A:
c ∈ C ⇒ c appears infinitely often (i.o.) in {c(t)}∞t=1, and a ∈ A ⇒ a i.o. in {a(t)}∞t=1.
The first claim is that there exist a∗ ∈ A that is a pure NE for game G. Observe that the sets |A| > 0
and |C| > 0 due to the finiteness of the possible association profiles. Suppose |A| = 1, then the single
element in A, say a∗, must be a NE. Suppose |A| > 1, and choose c∗ ∈ C. Pick a time t such that
c(t) = c∗. Note that c∗[i] is in the front of the memory for each user i, then with probability at least
( 1
M
)N , a(t+1) = c∗. This implies c∗ ∈ A. If c∗ is a NE, then our claim is proved. If c∗ is not a NE,
we will show that with positive probability, we can construct a finite sequence that leads to a NE. To
this end, consider the following steps of operation.
Step 1): With probability at least ( 1
M
)N , a(t+1) = c∗. Because c∗ is not a NE, then there exists
an i ∈ N such that c(t+1)[i] 6= c(t)[i]. Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 3, we can show that
R(at+1) < R
(
[c(t+1)[i],a
(t+1)
−i ]
)
. With probability at least ( 1
M
)N , every user j 6= i samples c(t)[j],
which is now at the second slot in the memory, while user i samples c(t+1)[i]. This event leads to
a(t+2) = [c(t+1)[i],a
(t+1)
−i ], and we have R(a(t+2)) > R(a(t+1)). Put index i into a set U : U = {i}. Note
in this stage, we have: a(t+2)[i] = c(t+1)[i]. Continue this process, until we reach a time t+n ≤ t+N
such that only users in the set U are willing to switch, i.e., ∀ j ∈ E , c(T )j = a
(T )
j . Note that the
requirement M ≥ N ensures that for all i, the set of best responses {c(m)[i]}(t+n)m=t is still in user i’s
memory. Let T = t+ n. Let E = N \ U .
Step 2): Observe that for all i ∈ U , there must exist a constant ki such that 0 < ki < n ≤ N and that
its current association a(T )[i] is sampled from its kith memory, i.e., c(T−ki)[i] = a(T )[i]. Pick q ∈ U
that has the largest ki and is willing to switch at time T : q = argmaxi∈U ,c(T )[i] 6=a(T )[i] ki. We can now
shift c(T−N) out of the memory and still be able to construct a(T+1) = [c(T )[q],a(T )−q ] with positive
probability, because all the elements in a(T )−q must have been appeared once in {c(t)}Tt=T−N+1. Move
q out of U and into E , let T = T + 1 and continue Step 2) until only users in the set E are willing to
switch. Change the role of U and E , and continue Step 2).
Repeating Step 2), we construct a sequence {R(a(t+l))} that is strictly increasing. Due to the finiteness
of the choice of a, there must exist a finite time instance T ∗ after which it is not possible to find an
association that differs from a(t+T ∗) with a single element and still have strict better system throughput.
Consequently, a∗ = a(t+T ∗) is an equilibrium profile. Thus, with positive probability, a NE profile a∗
appears after a(t+1) in finite steps. Because a(t+1) = c∗, with c∗ happens i.o., we must also have a∗
i.o., that is, a∗ ∈ A. The claim is proved.
The next claim is that the algorithm converges to a∗ with probability 1. Let {tk}∞k=1 denote the
subsequence of {t} in which a∗ happens. Define the event: Ck ,
⋂M
l=1{a
(tk+l) = a∗}, that is, starting
from a time tk, a∗ appears M+1 times consecutively. When Ck happens, we have: 1) at time tk+M+1,
c(tk+M+1) = a∗ because BRi(a∗) = a∗[i] ∀ i; 2) a(tk+M+l) = a∗ for all l ≥ 1 because after time
(tk + M + l), each user i’s memory will solely consist of a∗[i]. Note that if a(tk) = a∗ appears,
with probability at least ( 1
M
)N , a(tk+1) = a∗. This implies Pr(Ck) ≥ ( 1M )
N×M
. Let Cck denote the
complement set of Ck. We have:
Pr
⋂
t≥1
Cck
= lim
T→∞
Pr
(
T⋂
t=1
Cck
)
= lim
T→∞
T−1∏
k=1
(1− Pr(Ck))≤ lim
T→∞
(
1− (
1
M
)N×M
)T−1
= 0. (35)
This says Pr(a(t) converges to some a∗ ∈ A∗ eventually) = 1. 
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the simulation setting with N = 10,
W = 6, D = 0.3.
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Fig. 2. Three realizations of throughput. K = 512, N = 20,
W = 8.
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Fig. 3. Averaged convergence time v.s. number of users. Each
point in this figure is averaged over 200 random networks.
W = 8, K = 512, D = 0.4.
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Fig. 4. Averaged convergence time v.s. number of BSs with
and w/o costs. Each point in this figure is averaged over 200
random networks. ci = 1 Mbit/sec, N = 30, K = 512,
D = {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}.
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Fig. 5. Averaged system throughput v.s. number of BSs by
different algorithms and the maximum achievable throughput.
Each point in this figure is averaged over 100 random net-
works. N = 10, K = 64, D = {0.4, 0.8}.
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Fig. 6. Averaged system throughput v.s. number of BSs
by different algorithms. N = 30, K = 512, D =
{0.2, 0.5, 0.8}. Each point in this figure is averaged over
200 random networks.
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Fig. 7. Empirical CDF of the per-BS rate. Each curve in
this figure composed of the rate of the BSs over 100 random
networks. W = 8, N = 30, K = 512, D = {0.2, 0.8}.
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Fig. 8. Averaged throughput ratio (CAPA over nearest
neighbor) v.s. distribution factor D. N = 30, K = 512,
W = {2, 4, 8, 10, 12}. Each point in this figure is averaged
over 200 random networks.
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Fig. 9. Comparison of the empirical CDF of the users’ rates
in the multicell cellular networks. N = 40. Each curve in this
figure is the CDF of the users’ rates in 100 generations of the
network.
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Fig. 10. Evaluation of the performance of the proposed
algorithm in the presence of channel estimation error. Each
point in this figure is averaged over 200 random networks.
Fig. 11. Construction of the network for clause Cq = X1 ∨
X¯2 ∨X3 for CAPA resource allocation strategy.
